PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ADMINISTRATION.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds In re Smith's
Estate, 54 Atl. 174, that where the Supreme Court has dePreactation dared a judgment void, and the Court of Cornof Clams

mon Pleas has stricken it off, and all proceed-

ings thereunder, including a sale of the mortgaged premises
to the mortgagee, the latter may subsequently present his
claim in the Orphans' Court, on distribution of the proceeds
of the sale of the mortgagor's estate. See also Mutual Life
Insurance Co. of New York v. Tenan, 54 Atl. (Pa.) 172.
AMENDMENT.

It is held by the New York Supreme Court (Appellate
Division, Second Department), in Clark v. Brooklyn
Hcights R. Co., 79 N. Y. Supp. 81i, that on
Amount of
Dow Zes
the trial of a personal injury case, the testimony
being concluded, it is not an abuse of disdretion to permit an
amendment of the complaint from ten to twenty thousand
dollars.
BANKRUPTCY.

Where the opposing creditor to a bankrupt's discharge is
a partnership, the verification and signature of the firm to
the specifications may be made by one of the
tl,
vo

partners authorized to sign the firm name: U.
S. District Court (W. D., Tennessee), In re
Glass, I 19 Fed. 5o9. The court also holds that specifications in opposition to a bankrupt's discharge cannot be
verified by the oaths of attorneys or solicitors or other
agents, in the absence of a previous order of court allowing
the same, in which event both the order and the oath should
state the reasons therefor.
by
Prtnehfp
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BONDS.

A bond executed in pursuance of a statute providing for
an appeal bond is not necessarily rendered void because the
Validity,

statute is afterwards pronounced unconstitu-

tional: Supreme Court of Nebraska in Stcvcnson v. Morgan, 93 N. W. I 8o. The test of the enforceability
of such bond is whether a consid eration exists independent
of the statute. If so, and the bond has the other essentials
of a common-law contract, it may be enforced. See and
compare Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554, and Poole v.
Consideration

Kcrinit, 59 N. Y. 554.
CARRIERS.

The U. S. District Court (S. D., New York) holds in
De Sola v. Ponmares, I 19 Fed. 373, that the settled rule of
commercial law that freight prepaid, but which
Prepaid
is not earned by the delivery of the goods, is
Freight,
to be refunded, in the absence of special agreeRecovey
ment to the contrary, where the loss is not due to any fault
of the shipper, cannot be overcome by proof of a local custom that freight prepaid is not to be returned to the shipper
in case the vessel is lost on the voyage.
The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Brunswick &
W. R. Co. v. Ponder, 43 S. E. 430, that though a railroad
Protection of
Passenger.
Arrest)

company is bound to use extraordinary diligence
to protect a passenger, while in transit, from
violence or injury by third persons; yet where

the passenger is arrested by officers of the law, the company
is under no duty to inquire into the legality of the arrest.
So where such arrest by officers of the law is illegal, but the
railroad company has no notice of that fact, the company
is not liable to the passenger for a failure to interfere with
the officers and prevent the arrest, or for stopping the train
to allow the officers to remove their prisoner therefrom. *In
such a case the company is under no duty to see that the
officers use only such force as is necessary to make the
arrest.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska dealing with the question as to the use of the Bible in the public schools holds in
State v. Scheve, 93 N. W. i69, that the law
Religious
Freedom
does not forbid the use of the Bible in the
schools;
it is not proscribed by the constitutional propublic
visions in reference to religious freedom; and the courts
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have no right to declare its use to be unlawful because it is
possible or probable that those who are privileged to use it
will misuse the privilege by attempting to propagate their
own peculiar theological or ecclesiastical views and opinions.
The point where the courts may rightfully interfere to pre-'
vent the use of the Bible in a public school is where legitimate use has degenerated into abuse-where a teacher employed to give secular instruction has violated the constitution by becoming a sectarian propagandist. See the former opinion of the court in 91 N. W. 846.
In Grossman v. Camwinz, 79 N.. Y. Supp. goo, the New
York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Second DepartIterfagaco ment), holds that a statute providing that in
with Right cities of the first and second class any person
of Contrsa who should offer for sale any real property without the written authority of the owner of such property, or
of his attorney in fact, appointed in writing, or of a person
who has made a written contract for the purchase of such
property with the owner thereof, should be guilty of a misdemeanor, is unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty and
property without due process of law.
An act of the New York legislature permitted the court,
on application of either party to an action of divorce, at
any time after final judgment, "whether heretoD"r".for
Aim.ony
fore or hereafter rendered, to annul, vary or
modify" a direction of a judgment in divorce requiring a
husband to provide for the support of his wife, and for the
education and maintenance of the children. A man who
prior to the passage of this act had been decreed to pay to
his wife $4,ooo a year, applied to have the sum reduced on
account of a material change in his circumstances. The
Court of Appeals of New York holds in Livingston v. Livingston, 66 N. E. 123, that the act is unconstitutional in so
far as it attempts to confer a power on the court to anntil
or vary valid and final judgments entered before the passage
of the act. Three judges dissent.
CONTEMPT.

In Ogden v. State, 93 N. W. 203, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska holds that while a formal accusation is not necesPsecution: sary to a prosecution for contempt committed
in the presence of the court, the record must
Reord
show that such an offence has been committed in order to
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sustain a conviction. So a recital that the accused addressed
insulting and menacing language to the court is a mere conclusion; the language itself should be set out to enable the
reviewing court to determine whether it was actually contemptuous.
CONVERSION.

In State v. Omaha National Bank, 93 N. W. 319, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska holds that where property has
Mouve ot been taken from the plaintiff without his knowlDefendant
edge or consent, or of those having the lawful
custody and control over it, the motive which prompted the
defendant to receive and dispose of it is an immaterial
issue. But this rule does not apply when the plaintiff, his
agent or servant, having the lawful custody or control over
the property, consents to or requests the defendant to receive
and dispose of it. In such case guilty intent is an essential
element of conversion. Two judges dissent.' See Stephenr
v. Elwall, 4 Maule & S. 259. The case presents in the
majorityand minority opinions a thorough review of the
questions involved.
DISCOVERY.

An order for the examination of the defendant's books
and papers, containing no limitation on the time within
Books and

Papers

which inspection shall be made, is void: Su-

preme Court of Montana in State v. District
CoUrt, 71 P~c. 6o2.
DIVORCE.

A wife agreed not to conteft an action for divorce brought
against her by her husband in North Dakota, he agreeing
Decree,

Collateral
Attack

in return that. if he obtained the divorce, the

decree should contain a provision for the pay-

ment to her weekly of a certain sum for sup-

port. The decree contained the provision stipulated. Upon
these facts the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Third Department) holds in France v. France, 79
N. Y. Supp. 579. that, though the agreement was void as
against public policy, its invalidity was not available in a
collateral attack on the decree in a suit afterwards brought
by the wife in New York to recover installments due thereunder.
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The Supreme Court of Colorado holds in Branch v.
Branch, 71 Pac. 632, that the plaintiff in a divorce suit
having married pending the appeal from the
nlarrlago
Pending
decree granting the divorce is not entitled to be
Appea
heard on appeal, or to have the cause remanded
for a new trial, the decree being reversed.
DOWER.

The Court of Appeals of New York holds in Starbuck v.
Starbuck, 66 N. E. 193, that where one claiming to be the
Effect of
widow of a decedent sued for dower, an exDivorce
emplified copy of a decree of divorce obtained
in another state, in an action in which the decedent was personally served but did not appear, is competent evidence to
show that she was not the widow of the decedent or entitled
to dower in the estate acquired by him after the decree, as
she was estopped to impeach a judgment which she herself
had obtained. Compare Matter of Swales' Estate, 6o App.
Div. 599.
EMINENT DOMAIN.

The law of Vermont provides that one who desires to
erect or raise a dam to obtain water therefor, and thereby
Flowing
flow the lands of another, may secure the right
Lands
to do so if commissioners or the court shall find
that the flowing of the lands will be of "public benefit." A
petition for the appointment of commissioners, etc., showed
that the petitioner owned a dam, which he desired to raise
in order to generate electricity for the operation of a railroad. Under these facts the -Supreme Court of Vermont
holds in Avery v. Vermont Electric Co., 54 Atl. 179, that
the power of eminent domain could not be invoked on the
ground of public use, since, while the railroad must serve
the public, there was nothing binding petitioner to serve the
railroad or to give equal advantages to all.
EVIDENCE.

In an action to recover damages for property taken by a
railroad company, declarations of the owner of the land as
Vaiu. a
to its value, and his offer of it at a certain price,
,ropey
and a sale of a portion thereof, are admissible
to show his estimate of value: Supreme Court of Pennsyl-

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
EVIDENCE (Continued).

vania in Houston v. Western Washington R. Co., 54 At.
166.
In a prosecution for homicide, the issue being whether
the defendant, when he killed the deceased, believed that the
deceased was about to assault his wife-defendSimilar
occurren s

ant's sister-testimony showing that, to the

defendant's knowledge, the deceased had made prior assaults on his wife was admissible: Supreme Court of Montana in State v. Felker, 71 Pac. 668. See also Gray v. State,
72 S. W. i69, where it is held by the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas that on the issue whether one selling liquor
to a minor knew he was under age, testimony that two
others, both of them minors, drank with him at the same
time, is relevant.
A written agreement between the vendor and vendee for
the sale, purchase and conveyance of land is not executed
Consideration

by and merged in the deed, as to the stipulations

of the vendee therein concerning the consideration to be
paid for the property; and such written agreement is competent to show the actual consideration: Supreme Court of
Ohio in Conklin v. Hancock, 66 N. E. 518. Compare Brumbaugh v. Chapman, 13 N. E. (Ohio), 584.
In Calivada Colonization Co. v. Hays, i I9 Federal,
202, the United States Circuit Court (Western Division,
Pastimy

of

Pennsylvania)

holds that the Pennsylvania

act, permitting a party to be called and exTasty o
by Adversary amined "as on cross-examination" has no application in a suit in equity in a federal court,
and a party so called and examined therein becomes a witness for the party calling him, and his testimony is to be
given weight accordingly. See Drave v. Fabel, 132 U. S.
487.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds in McEvoy v. Tournzel, 8o N. Y. Supp.
Medical Books 71, that in an action for personal injuries it
was error to permit the defendant to read in evidence extracts from a standard medical book, and this though the
matter contained in the book had been in some respects the
subject of examination by the plaintiff as a part of her
affirmative case and though the defendant had a right to
cross-examine the physician who testified on such subject
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with respect thereto, it appearing that he did not do so,
but that he attempted to read the extracts as a part of his
affirmative case. See Foggett v. Fischer, 23 App. Div. 207.
HABEAS CORPUS.

The U. S. Circuit Court (M. D. Pennsylvania) holds in
Ex parte Rearick, 1i8 Fed. 928, that while the United
States courts have power to intervene by Iabeas
Fedrat and
State courts corpus in a case where a disregard of the federal
law is charged, it is not always expedient to do.so, involving
as it does a conflict of authority which it is desirable to
avoid. Where, therefore, an agent of a non-resident corporation was arrested for violating a borough ordinance
imposing a license on canvassers, and on conviction his appeal was allowed to a higher state court, he was held not to
be entitled to a discharge on habeas corpus in the federal
courts, pending determination of the appeal in the state
court, on the ground that the ordinance under which he
was convicted was invalid as against him, as a regulation
of interstate commerce. See the recent case of Minnesota
v. Brundage, i90 U. S. 499.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Where a landlord agreed to make repairs, an action ex
dclicto for injuries sustained by reason of his failure to
contract to make repairs cannot be maintained in the abRepair
sence of notice to the landlord of the need of
repairs: Court of Appeals of Maryland in Thompson v.
Clemens, 53 Atl. 919. See also Hines v. Wilcox (Tenn.),
34 L. R. A. 824.
The general rule that upon a tenant's taking a new lease
the right to fixtures upon the premises at the time of the
new lease is lost unless specifically reserved, is
Fixtur s,
Renewal oi well settled. The rule appears in a somewhat
modified form in O'Brien v. Mueller, 53 Atl.
Let"
663, where it is held by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
that where the owner of a barroom and restaurant leased
the premises, and sold the fixtures to the tenant and in the
paper then executed authorized the tenant to remove
any or all of said property, and agreed "not to regard them,
or any of them, as fixtures." the right of the tenant to remove such articles was not lost by taking a new lease after
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the first lease expired, and failing to mention or reserve
such articles in the new lease. See Sheldon v. Edwards,
35 N. Y. 279.

Where, while the relation of landlord and tenant is existing between a person in occupation of the second story
Obstruction
of a building, whose rear abuts upon a yard,
by Landlord the landlord builds in the yard a three-story
extension, cutting off light and air from the rear windows
of the tenant's premises, a mandatory injunction will issue
compelling the landlord to remove so much of the extension
as is higher than the windows of the tenant: New York
Supreme Court (Special Term, New York County) in
Stevens v. Solomon, 79 N. Y. Supp. 136. See Doyle v.
Lord, 64 N. Y. 432. Nor is it material that "the defendant
succeeded in completing the structure before service of the
injunction order was made upon him. The plaintiff had
promptly objected to his acts, and notified him of her
purpose to bring the action. Daniel v. Ferguson (x891],
2 Ch. 27."
LARCENY.

To acquire a property right in animals ferae naturae, so
that they may be the subject of larceny, it is well settled that
the pursuer must bring them into his power
Anlotia
erse
and control, so that he may subject them to his
Maturse
own use at-his pleasure, and must so maintain his
possession and control as to indicate that he does not intend
to abandon them again to the world at large; but it is held
in State v. Shaw, 65 N. E. 875. that in cases where larceny
is charged, the law does not require absolute security against
the possibility of escape.
MARSHALING ASSETS.

In Ncw York Public Library v. Tilden, 79 N. Y. Supp.
161. it appeared that a debtor agreed that a particular

creditor should have a lien upon two funds,
one of personal and the other of real property.
The New York Supreme Court (Special Term,
New York County) holds that payment should be rfiade to
such doubly secured creditor one-half from each fund,
where other claims against the personalty, upon the singly
secured creditors have no lien, would exhaust the fund.
Doubly
ecured
Credltor
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In re Municipal Fuel Plants, 66 N. E. 25, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds that though the
Deallng I.
legislature cannot authorize cities and towns to
Fuel
buy fuel and sell it to their inhabitants in competition with private dealers, yet where, by reason of the
supply of fuel being very small, and the difficulty of obtaining it very great, persons desiring to-purchase it are unable
to supply themselves through private enterprise, the government may constitute itself an agent for the relief of the
community, and money expended for that purpose would
be expended for public use. One judge dissents. The

opinion of the justices in 155 Mass. 6oi, will be recalled.
. NEGLIGENCZ.

In Texas State Fair v. Brittain, 118 Fed. 713, the U. S.
Circuit Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) holds that where
PersomUnd.

a state fair association, under a contract giv-

ing the exclusive use of its ground to an exhibitor, advertised such exhibit as one of the
attractions of the fair, it was liable for injuries to a spectator
caused by the falling of seats negligently constructed by
the exhibitor. "It may be," says the court, "as between
the Texas State Fair and Smith & Lucas [the exhibitors],
the latter were authorized, on such terms as to them were
satisfactory, to carry on and supervise the side show; but
it seems clear that no contractual relations between such
parties can be invoked to release the state fair, under the
Contract

WItha wct

state of case shown in the record, from the duty of exercis-

ing reasonable care in the interests of the people who were
attending that fair, or were witnessing such attractions in
side shows as it offered to the public." See also Sebeck v.
Plattdentsche Volkfest Verein (N. J.), 46 At. 631, 50
L. R. A. i99.
The very recent case of Thornton v. Maine State Agricultural Society, 53 Atl. (Maine) 979, is also noteworthy
as an application of similar principles under an analogous
state of facts.
NOT &

A., owing B. money, agreed to make his notes therefor,
with C. as surety, giving a temporary deed of trust as
nake.e
security till C.'s signature could be obtained,
R.iwe;
the deed of trust to be then cancelled. A. got
C.'s signature written on the back of the notes, and B. can-
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celled the deed of trust. The Supreme Court of Mississippi

holds, in Pearl v. Cortright, 33 Southern,

72,

that C. was

a co-maker of the notes on the same consideration as A.,
and further that C. was not released from any liability on
account of B.'s cancelling the deed of trust, as it could not

have been enforced against A., and B. was unaffected by any
fraud practiced by A. in getting C.'s signature. See also
Graves v. Tucker, io Smedes & M. 9.
The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in State Mut. Life
and Annuity Ass'n. Ni. Baldwin, 43 S. E. 262, that where
a promissory note has been satisfied in full, and
Payment,
Subsequent
the payee, instead of complying with a promise
Protest,
to return it to the maker, negligently sends it
Dowszes
to a bank "for collection, with instructions to
protest said note if not paid," and it is accordingly protested
for non-payment, such negligent conduct on the part of the
payee amounts to an actionable wrong if injury results
therefrom to the maker's financial standing.
PARTITION.

In an action for partition of certain lands, the complaiit
alleged that the plaintiff and certain defendants were owners
Parts, as joint tenants or tenants in common of the
AVrs
land; that other defendants claimed interests
Claimants
therein adverse to the plaintiff and his cotenants, the extent of which was unknown to the plaintiff,
and that they were in possession of certain portions of the
land in hostility to the plaintiff, but contained no allegation that such defendants were tenants in common. With
one judge dissenting the Court of Appeals of New York
holds that it was erroneous to dismiss such complaint as
to such defendants on the ground that they were not proper
parties, and that the issues raised by the complaint could
not be tried in partition: Satterlee v. Kobbe, 65 N. E. 952.
See also Weston v. Stoddard, 137 N. Y. I 19.
PARTNERSHIP.

In Fisk v. Fisk, 79 N. Y. Supp. 37, the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First Department) holds
Rigt to
that though, where all the members of a firm
?m=
die without having made any disposition of the
right to use the firm name, that right does not pass to the
personal representatives 6f the last survivor, but dies with
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him, nevertheless, such personal representatives, being entitled to the good will of the late firm, are -entitled to an
injunction restraining third persons from using the partnership name and pretending to be its successor. Two
judges dissent. "As to administrators the policy of the
law is that they should take everything, as far as possible,
wearing'the semblance of property of the intestate as part of
the assets to pay debts. If the right to state that one has
succeeded to the property and business of the firm has been
rendered valuable, then it. is as much a property right, to
be sold by administrators, as the goods which a merchant
has in his store when he dies; and strangers who endeavor
to illegally appropriate such a valuable right should be prevented from so doing by a court of equity."
PLEDGE.

The Supreme Court of Iowa holds in Loomis v. Refiners,
93 N. W. 95, that where a pledgee of bank stock honestly
and in good faith consulted an attorney in refFIailure
erence to a defence in a replevin action, and did
to Defend
not defend because he was advised that he could
Suit
not do so successfully, he did what an ordinarily prudent
man would do under the circumstances, and was not liable
for the loss thereof, even though the replevin action was
barred by limitations. See also Willits v. Hatch, 132 N. Y.
41.
REFORMATION.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland holds in Boulden v.
Wood, 53 Atl. 91i, that a contract for sale of land having
provided that it should be subject to the operaMutua
tion of a mortgage of $i,ooo, and the scrivener,
Mistake
whom the grantee instructed to prepare the deed in conformity with the agreement, having omitted reference to
the mortgage, the deed will be reformed, notwithstanding
any negligence of the grantor, who merely asked, without
looking to see, if it was made subject to the mortgage.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

In St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 65
N. E. 967, the Court of Appeals of New York holds that
Sale of

where the defendant contracted to sell and de-

liver to the plaintiff a fixed quantity of pulp
wood annually for a certain period of years, to be taken
Wood
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from land belonging to the defendant, and it also agreed
not to sell the land so as to prevent the performance of the
contract, and that the purchaser would have an equitable
interest in the wood for advances made, it is an agreement
giving the purchaser certain rights in "connection with the
land, entitling him to relief in equity on failure of the defendant to perform.
On the other hand, in the recent Pennsylvania case of
Mfundy v. Brooks, 53 Atl. IooO, the contract sought to be
specifically enforced was for "all the hemlock bark standing, growing, lying or being" upon certain land, and the
Supreme Court holds that it will not enjoin a sale to some
one else, the plaintiff, it is said, having an adequate remedy
at law.
A contract for the sale of an undivided interest in land
provided that the land was to be surveyed by the vendee
HArdshIp

at his expense; that, when the amount thereof

was ascertained, the vendee should pay a certain price per
acre for the vendor's undivided interest, and the vendor
should make a quitclaim deed. The vendee attempted to
survey the land, but his surveyors were prevented by force
by third parties claiming title from doing so; and the
vendee was advised that he would be in great danger of
being killed if he went on the premises. The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky holds that, as the contract could not
be performed until the number of acres was ascertained by
survey, and as this could n6t be done without great hardship to the vendee, specific performance would not be enforced: Williamson v. Dils, 72 S. W. 292.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Where the physician and surgeon operates upon a patient
and neglects or carelessly forgets to remove a foreign subime
stance placed in the wound (e. g., a sponge),
Covered
and closes the incision, with this foreign substance remaining therein, and this continues during his
entire professional relation to the case, and is present when
he abandons or otherwise retires therefrom, the statute of
limitations does not commence to run against a right to sue
and recover on account of such want of skill, care and attention, until the case has been so abandoned or the professional relation otherwise terminated: Supreme Court of
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Ohio in Gillette v. Tucker, 65 N. E. 86j. Three judges
dissent on the ground that "if the original act of negligence
causes damage, although only nominal in extent, a cause of
action arises co instante, and that consequential damages
may be recovered thereon up to the time of the trial." See
Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317.
SUBROGATION.

In Elliott v. Tainter, 93 N. V. 124, it is held by the Supreme Court of Minnesota that where a person having an
Payment of
interest in real property has paid money to
Ucas
satisfy a lien thereon to protect such. interest,
he is entitled for the purpose of effecting substantial justice,
to be substituted in place of the incumbrancer, and treated
as an assignee of the lien, notwithstanding it had been discharged of record.
SURETIES.

In McDowell County Commissioners v. Nichols, 42 S. E.
938, it is held by the Supreme Court of North Carolina
Indemnity
that one about to become a surety with others
for One

can stipulate with the principal, without the

knowledge of the other sureties, for a separate indemnity for
his own benefit, in which, in the absence of fraud, or unless
it was intended for the benefit of all, the others cannot participate till he is reimbursed. See Long v. Barnett, .38
N. C. 631.
.TELEPHONES.

By mistake, a physician's telephone was disconnected for
non-payment of rent, when the rent was in fact paid. During the eighteen hours that it was disconnected,
Wrongful
tscoazncpersons endeavoring to reach the physician by

tfon, amags telephone, were informed that the telephone had

been disconnected for non-payment of rent. The physician
suffered no pecuniary injury. The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky holds in Cunberland Telephone and Telegraph
Co. v. Hendon, 71 S.W. 435. that in an action by the physician against the company, he could not recover punitive
damages, but that the measure of damages was the amount
paid for the service for the time the telephone was disconnected, taking as a basis the amount paid per month. See
Robinson v. Telegraph Co. (Ky.), 68 S.W. 656.
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In National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel Co.,
I 9 Fed. 294, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Seventh

P-ey
therein,

COpYib~t

Circuit) holds that the matter gathered and
transmitted by a telegraph company, and printed
on a tape by tickers in the offices -of its cus-

tomers, consisting merely of a notation of current events,
such as market quotations or the result of a race or game,
and having only a transient value, due solely to its quick
transmission and distribution, is not copyrightable as literary
property, under the constitution and statutes of the United
States; but is essentially a commercial product, and as such
the object of ownership as property by individuals and protection by the courts. So in Illinois Commission Co. v.
Cleveland Tel. Co., 119 Fed. 301, the Same court holds that
a telegraph company which by contract with the Board of
Trade of Chicago is furnished by such corporation with the
continuous market quotations from its exchange, for which
the company pays, and which it transmits and distributes to
patrons who pay therefor, has a property right in such quotations, which entitles it to protection by injunction restraining others, who are not its patrons, from taking the same
from its wires or from the offices of its patrons, and selling
or distributing them in competition.
TENANT BY THE CURTESY.

A tenant by the curtesy cannot convey the right to a
lessee to extract oil from the land, and a lease executed by
oR US"

him purporting to convey such right is void:

U. S. Circuit Court (N. D., \est Virginia) in Barnsdall v.
Boley, I19 Fed. 191.
WITNESSES.

In Gordon v. Sullivan, 93 N. V. 457, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin holds that where a married woman was sued
Competency.

as an administratrix, her husband was not de-

barred from testifying on the ground of his
relationship to her. See Strong v. City of
Stevens Point, 62 Wis. 255.
Husband
and Wife

